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Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Re:

AUG 1 0 ?*|0

Birsa v. Birsa
Case No. 20000177-CA

dark of fhfe court

Dear Clerk:
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 24(i) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure the
Appellant in the above-referenced matter brings to the attention of this court the decision of the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in Lesley K. Braun v. Jeffrey David Hedley, 2000 Md.
App. Lexis 73, published April 26, 2000 in particular that a portion of the opinion contained
within part II; "custody and right to travel" wherein all of the cases cited by both parties are
analyzed and appropriate limitations on the right to travel insofar as it deals with relocation are
articulated. This applies to and supplements Right to travel point B page 15 of Appellant's Brief.
For the convenience of the Court a copy of that decision is attached to this letter.
Sincerely,

David S. Dolowitz
DSD\ab
Enclosures
cc:
Dennis Birsa
Kellie F. Williams
f:\angie\dsd\fran\birsa\appeals\clericapp.lct

Page 11

1ST CASE of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
LESLIE K. BRAUN v. JEFFREY DAVID HEADLEY
No. 0405, September Term, 1999
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND
2000 Md. App. LEXIS 73
April 26, 2000, Filed
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1] APPEAL FROM THE Circuit
Court for Harford County. Cypert O. Whitfill, JUDGE.
DISPOSITION: JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. COSTS TO
BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
CORE TERMS: relocation, custody, right to travel, constitutional right to travel, travel, custodial parent, material change, visitation, best interest, custodial, implicated, relocating, modification, addressing, frequent,
residents, asthma, constitutional right, forty-five, relocate, trigger, mile, interplay, diagnosis, compelling state
interest, constitutional rights, non-custodial, modified,
distance, enjoyed

transfer custody from Leslie K. Braun, appellant, to
Jeffrey David Headley, appellee, after appellant's relocation from Maryland to Arizona, because the change
in custody was not in the best interests of the child.
nl Appellant points out that she did not make an
argument based on Saenz in the trial court because
Saenz was not decided until after the trial of this case.
In light of the timing of the Saenz decision, and in
order to provide guidance to lower courts, we will
exercise our discretion to decide the issue pursuant
to Maryland Rule 8-131.
[*2]

COUNSEL: ARGUED BY: Francis A. Pommett, III of
Baltimore, MD, FOR APPELLANT.
ARGUED BY: Todd K. Mohink (Law Offices of David
L. Ruben on the brief) all of Ellicott City, MD, FOR
APPELLEE.
JUDGES: ARGUED BEFORE DAVIS, HOLLANDER,
and ADKINS, JJ. Opinion by ADKINS, J.
OPINIONBY: ADKINS
OPINION:
Opinion by Adkins, J.
We must determine in this appeal whether the Court
of Appeals's decision in Domingues v. Johnson, 323
Md. 486, 593 A.2d 1133 (1991), which holds that the
relocation of a child may constitute a change in circumstances sufficient to trigger a review of custody, applies a
standard that violates a custodial parent's constitutional
right to travel. Relying on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 119 S.
Q. 1518, 143 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1999), appellant argues that the Domingues standards must be modified,
nl Appellant further argues that we should reverse the
decision of the Circuit Court for Harford County to

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
The minor child, Theresa, was born on November
11, 1993. Appellant filed a complaint to prove paternity and establish child support on May 11, 1994,
naming appellee as the father. Following the determination that appellee was the father, custody was awarded
to appellant and appellee was ordered to pay approximately $ 316 monthly in child support. n2 Appellee was
granted reasonable visitation, and subsequently, a visitation schedule was established. The visitation order of
March 7, 1995, initially granted appellee visitation from
9:00 a.m. Saturday morning until 9:00 p.m. Saturday
evening for two consecutive Saturdays, and then every
other weekend with rotating holidays.
n2 Arrears were established at the amount of $
1,645 as of October 21, 1994, and were to be paid
back at $31.58 monthly.
On October 16, 1998, appellant moved to Arizona.
On that same date, appellant filed a complaint to modify visitation stating that due to her "chronic pain" and
"illness," she had "decided [*3] to move" to a "dryer climate, which [would] enable her to better tolerate her var-
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ious health problems." Appellant also contended in the
motion that visitation should thereafter "be conditioned
on [appellee] paying all transportation costs incident to
such visitation, in advance; or, providing round-trip
airline tickets for each scheduled visitation." Appellee
filed an answer and a counter-complaint for sole custody and/or for modification of custody, requesting an
emergency custody hearing. A hearing was set for and
held on December 16, 1998, and the matter was continued. On December 17, 1998, the court ordered that
assessments of both parties and Theresa be conducted
by the Office of Family Court Services. On January
26, 1999, the hearing was held to receive the report of
John Mahlmann, Ph.D, of the Office of Family Court
Services. Dr. Mahlmann interviewed the parties and
Theresa, and recommended that "both parties attend the
Divorce Education Program" and that each party have
a "psychological evaluation." After receiving the report
from the doctor, the court concluded that a trial was necessary. The court ordered that appellant, appellee, and
Theresa each have a psychological [*4] evaluation by
Dr. Michael Gombatz, and the evaluations were scheduled. n3 Subsequently, the court appointed an attorney
for Theresa. A two-day trial was held in mid-April.
n3 Appellee was ordered to pay the cost of these
evaluations, not to exceed $ 1,500.
At the trial, Dr. Gombatz's report was admitted into
evidence. Dr. Gombatz reported that on February 23,
1999, for the scheduled joint interview with both parties, appellant "was approximately a half hour to an hour
late." He stated that appellant "interrupted several times"
during appellee's presentation. He stated that appellant
was "inflexible unless it was to her advantage," and that
she "was consistently vague and non-responsive . . .
[and] it appeared that [appellant] did deny [appellee] visitation, rationalizing the reasons for it." After conversing
with Dr. Mahlmann, Dr. Gombatz reported that there
was no record of any current significant health conditions facing Theresa, contradicting appellant's diagnosis
that Theresa had asthma. Nor was Theresa [*5] being
treated for asthma. When questioned by Dr. Gombatz
as to why she "appeared not to be telling me the truth?"
appellant answered: "It is very oppressive. I'm tired of
it."
The doctor also conducted individual evaluation sessions of each of the parties, first with Theresa, and then
alone. Again, appellant "arrived over an hour late" for
the appointment, and stated that, "It was not my fault."
When Dr. Gombatz interviewed Theresa alone, appellant, "instead of going into the waiting room like I asked,

[] put her ear against the door in an attempt to listen to
our conversation." Shortly after the questioning began,
the doctor left the office to get appellant and "was startled to see her standing by the door." Dr. Gombatz
reported that appellant "started berating" him regarding
his questioning of Theresa.
Dr. Gombatz reported that appellee's "clinical profile
was essentially within normal limits" and his "projective
testing is valid." In contrast, appellant's clinical profile suggests borderline-narcissistic personality disorder.
Her scores suggest deficits in mood stability, relationships and particularly with her own sense of identity. . .
. She tends to experience intense emotions [*6] and frequent mood swings with recurring periods of depression,
anxiety and anger followed by dejection and apathy. . .
. In addition, [appellant] is quite self-centered. She has
an expectation entitlement which, if given the opportunity she will exploit people and manipulate them. She .
. . thinks primarily of herself. . . . Projective testing
indicates she has deficiencies in her capacity for control
and tolerance for stress.
Dr. Gombatz recommended that appellee "is the
more competent parent and Theresa's interests would
be served if custody and placement were with him." His
reasons included his finding that appellant acts "as if
Theresa is her property . . . rather than a young girl
whose development is to be fostered." He further reported: (1) "There is . . . no doubt in my mind that
the move to Arizona was precipitated by a desire to limit
Theresa's contact with her birth father. The claim that
she moved to Arizona for Theresa's medical benefit. . .
has no merit;" (2) appellee "has a healthier relationship
with Theresa than" appellant; and (3) appellee "would
likely be much fairer in allowing Theresa contact with
[appellant] than [she] would be with him."
Both appellant [*7] and appellee testified at trial, as
well as other witnesses called by each side. Appellee
described the circumstances of appellant's move to
Arizona, and how she notified him by telephone message on her day of departure that she was leaving, but
failed to provide any information about her new residence until about six weeks later. After appellee learned
of appellant's new residence and telephone number, he
made frequent attempts to call Theresa, but appellant
substantially and repeatedly interfered with his ability
to speak with the child. Appellee also described how
Theresa would not call him dad or other appropriate
name, and addressed him without any appellation. Wade
Headley, Theresa's paternal grandfather, testified that
Theresa said that "if I call him Daddy, I will get punished at home." Appellee's mother also described how
appellant made Theresa give away toys and other gifts,
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including a picture painted by her, that were given to
Theresa by her paternal grandparents. Appellee testified
that Matthew, appellant's son from another relationship,
repeatedly referred to him as "Doo-doo."
Appellant described the early history of Theresa's life,
and emphasized how appellee had originally [*8] denied his paternity of Theresa. She ascribed her move to
Arizona to health reasons, explaining that she thought
that Theresa had asthma, and that the drier climate would
be better for Theresa. n4 Although Theresa's medical
records were introduced into evidence, appellant was unable to point to any indication in the records that Theresa
suffered from asthma. She testified that Theresa did not
like to visit with her father. She acknowledged giving
away the gifts from Theresa's grandparents, indicating
that she did not have sufficient room in her residence to
store all the "junk" that a child accumulated. She acknowledged that Matthew referred to appellee as "DooDoo."
n4 Although in her complaint appellant asserted
that the move was to improve her personal health,
she offered no evidence to support this claim, other
than a statement that she had done general research
and learned that a drier climate was beneficial to
health.
On April 20, 1999, the court issued an opinion from
the bench that awarded custody of [*9] Theresa to appellee, and reserved visitation with appellant "until further order of this court." This appeal was timely noted.
Additional facts will be added as necessary to our discussion of the issues.
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review
A trial court cannot, in the exercise of its discretionary
power, infringe upon constitutional rights enjoyed by the
parties. SttLewisv.
Warden, 16 Md. App. 339, 342,
296A.2d 428 (1972). Because appellant asserts that her
right to travel under the United States Constitution is
implicated, our standard of review in considering this
issue (in Section II of this opinion) shall be an independent constitutional appraisal. See Ebert v. Md. St.
Bd. of Censors, 19 Md. App. 300, 316, 313 A.2d 536
(1973).
Our review of the issue of whether the trial court erred
in holding that the best interests of Theresa called for

an award of custody to appellee shall be governed by
the abuse of discretion standard. The determination of
which parent should be awarded custody rests within
the sound discretion of the trial court. See Robinson v.
Robinson, 328 Md. 507, 513, 615 A.2d 1190 (1992).
The court's exercise [*10] of discretion must be guided
first, and foremost, by what it believes would promote
the child's best interest. See Kemp v. Kemp, 287 Md.
165, 170, 411 A.2d 1028 (1980). Additionally, the trial
court's opportunity to observe the demeanor and credibility of both the parties and the witnesses is of particular
importance. See Petrini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 470,
648 A.2d 1016 (1994).
When a trial court finds that the moving party has
satisfied the burden and established a justification for a
change in custody, those findings must be accorded great
deference on appeal, and will only be disturbed if they
are plainly arbitrary or clearly erroneous. See Scott v.
Dep't of Social Services, 76 Md. App. 357, 382-83,
545 A.2d 81, cert, denied, 314Md. 193, 550A.2d381
(1988).
II.
Custody and Right to Travel
Appellant argues that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Saenz, supra, requires a change in Maryland law
respecting the consideration of one parent's relocation
of residence for purposes of deciding whether custody
should be modified. She contends that the Domingues
holding that relocation [*11] of residence by a parent
could itself constitute the basis for a finding of a material
change in circumstances is no longer valid. She asserts
that the Domingues standard violates a person's constitutional right to travel, as recently defined in Saenz.
Appellant insists that in the present case the court ordered
a change of custody based exclusively on her relocation,
thereby violating her constitutional rights. We hold, for
the reasons set forth below, that the standards established
by the Court of Appeals in Domingues do not violate the
rights of a custodial parent to travel.
The Domingues Court was called upon to evaluate
our holding in Jordan v. Jordan, 50 Md. App. 437,
439A.2d26, cert, denied, 293 Md. 332 (1982), that
relocation of a parent cannot constitute the basis for a
modification of custody. See Domingues, 323 Md. at
500. In so doing, the Court examined our statement in
Jordan that "relocating as a result of remarriage, employment and the like cannot of itself render a parent to
whom custody has been granted unfit and thereby constitute the basis for a modification of custody." Id. at
500 [* 12] (quoting Jordan, 50 Md. App. at 447, in turn
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quoting Hoyt v. Boyer, 5 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2135,
2135-36 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Sullivan County, 1979), modified on other grounds, 77 A.D.2d 685 (1980)). The
Court, overruling our holding in Jordan, observed:
The statement approved by the Court of Special Appeals
strikes us as far too absolute in its terms. In the first
place, it is not necessary that a parent be declared unfit
before joint or sole custody can be changed from that
parent. Moreover, changes brought about by the relocation of a parent may, in a given case, be sufficient to
justify a change in custody. The result depends upon the
circumstances of each case.
The understandable desire of judges and attorneys to
find bright-line rules to guide them in this most difficult area of the law does not justify the creation of hard
and fast rules where they are inappropriate. Indeed, the
very difficulty of the decision-making process in custody cases flows in large part from the uniqueness of
each case, the extraordinarily broad spectrum of facts
that may have to be considered in any given case, and
the inherent difficulty of formulating [*13] bright-line
rules of universal applicability in this area of the law.
Domingues, 323 Md. at 500-01.
The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of
a citizen's right to travel between states, see e.g., Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S. Ct. 995, 31 L. Ed.
2d 274 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969), overruled
in part, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 US. 651, 94 S. Ct.
1347, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1974). This right includes
the right "to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start
a new life . . . ." Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629, 89 S.
Ct. at 1328. Although the treatment and handling of
a custodial parent's decision to relocate has been addressed by many jurisdictions, see Carol S. Bruch and
Janet M. Bowermaster, The Relocation of Children and
Custodial Parents: Public Policy, Past and Present, 30
Fam. L.Q. 245 (1996) (and cases cited therein), only
a few courts have considered how the custodial parent's right to travel plays a role in a court's decision regarding custody under these circumstances. See Tabitha
Sample and Teresa Reiger, [*14] Relocation Standards
and Constitutional Considerations, 10 J. Am. Acad.
Matrim. Law. 229, 237 (1998) ("Sample and Reiger").
Like many other states, our Court of Appeals has thoroughly addressed the issue of relocation by a custodial
parent, and has clearly set forth the standard and burden of proof involved in making determinations of this
issue, see Domingues, supra; McCready v. McCready,
323 Md. 476, 593 A.2d 1128 (1991), but has not been
called upon to address the constitutional right to travel

in this context. n5
n5 The constitutional right to travel was asserted
before this court in Schaefer v. Cusack, 124 Md.
App. 288, 722 A.2d 73 (1998), but was not our
basis for decision. In Schaefer we reviewed a trial
court order awarding custody of a minor child to one
parent for a period of years, but changing custody
to the father when the child completed fifth grade.
The order also required that the parents live within
forty-five miles of each other. The mother, who was
awarded custody, appealed from the order, contesting, inter alia, the requirement that she live within
forty-five miles of the father. She asserted several
constitutional rights, including the right to travel, as
well as arguing that the trial court had no jurisdiction
to grant such request. We struck down the forty-five
mile limitation, holding that "the best interest of the
child can be determined better at the time a relocation is proposed than in an attempt to look into the
future and to say now that the best interest of the
child requires a present determination that a separation of the parents by more than forty-five miles
would have an adverse effect upon the child." Id. at
307. We did not address the constitutional right to
travel argument.
[*15]
The right to travel is not explicitly set forth in the
United States Constitution, but the Supreme Court "long
ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and
our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to
require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the
length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes,
rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement." Shapiro, supra, 394 U.S. at 629,
89 S. Ct. at 1329.
The Supreme Court's Saenz Decision
The Supreme Court revisited the right to travel in
Saenz, supra, when the Court was called upon to interpret the constitutionality of a statute that limited the
maximum welfare benefits available to state residents
who had resided in a state under twelve months. Under
the statute, residents would receive only the amount of
benefits they would have received in the state of their
prior residence for the first year that they resided in their
new home state. Two California residents filed an action
challenging the minimum residency requirement of the
statute.
California argued that the statute was not enacted for
the purpose of inhibiting migration [*16] and that "it
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does not penalize the right to travel because new arrivals
are not ineligible for benefits during their first year of
residence." Saenz, 526 U.S. at ,119 S. Ct. at 1525.
The state further argued that it would save millions of
dollars in annual welfare costs, and that this "was an
appropriate exercise of budgetary authority as long as
the residency requirement did not penalize the right to
travel." Id. at , 119 S. Ct. at 1523. California argued
that the statute should be upheld if it is supported by a
rational basis and the state's interest in saving millions
of dollars meets that test. See id. at ,119 S. Ct. at
1525.
The Supreme Court took this opportunity to address
the issue of the right to travel. According to Saenz, "the
word 'travel' is not found in the text of the Constitution.
Yet the 'constitutional right to travel from one State to
another' is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence." Id.
at ,119 S. Ct. at 1524 (citation omitted). "The right
is so important that it is 'assertable against private interference as well as governmental action . . . a virtually
unconditional personal [*17] right. . . .'"Id. (quoting
Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 643, 89 S. Ct. at 1336 (Stewart,
J. concurring)).
The right to travel "embraces at least three different
components." 526 U.S. at ,119 S. Ct. at 1525. The
Court explained the components as: (1) the right of a citizen of one state to enter and leave another state; (2) the
right of a citizen of one state "to be treated as a welcome
visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present" in the state; and (3) "for those travelers
who elect to become permanent residents, the right to
be treated like other citizens of" the state. Id. Although
the precise source of this right is obscure, see Shapiro,
394 U.S. at 630 n.8, 89 S. Ct. at 1329 n.8, it originated out of concern over state discrimination against
outsiders, rather than concerns over the general ability
to travel interstate. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at ,119 S.
Ct. at 1524.
In contrast to appellant, the Saenz plaintiffs were the
subject of discrimination because their rights to welfare
benefits from the state were automatically limited by
their move to California, regardless of their need for
[*18] welfare. As the Court said:
Neither the duration of respondents' California residence, nor the identity of their prior States of residence,
has any relevance to their need for benefits. Nor do
those factors bear any relationship to the State's interest in making an equitable allocation of the funds to be
distributed among its needy citizens.
Id. at

, 119 S. Ct. at 1528.

The component of the right to travel implicated in
Saenz rests on the first sentence of Article IV, § 2 of
the Constitution, which provides: "The Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States." It was the "third aspect
of the right to travel - the right of the newly arrived
citizen to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed
by other citizens of the same State," id. at , 1 1 9 S.
Ct. at 1526, that was implicated by the discriminatory
welfare classification. The welfare classification based
on duration of residence was held a violation of the right
to travel and a penalty "since the right to travel embraces
the citizen's right to be treated equally in her new State
of residence. . . ." Id. at , [*19] 119 S. Ct. at 1527.
In contrast, the Domingues Court created no discriminatory classification between those who are already residents of a state, and those who migrate to that state for
residence. n6 The Court simply recognized that a determination of custody is a multi-faceted decision, but
that the best interests of the child must override all other
competing interests, including the parent's interest in retaining custody, if a relocation would be adverse to the
child. For this reason, we do not see Saenz as shedding
new light on the subject of how the right to travel should
interplay with the concerns of a court in addressing the
best interests of the child in the context of a custodial
parent's relocation.
n6 The constitutional right to travel was not
asserted by the relocating custodial parent in
Domingues.
The Constitutional Right to Travel Is Qualified
We think, however, that the constitutional right to
travel should not be ignored in custody decisions involving the decision [*20] of one parent to relocate. Our
research discloses only a few other jurisdictions in which
the constitutional right to travel was asserted to defend
against a change in custody based on a proposed relocation by the custodial parent. In the few cases that we
have found where the constitutional right to travel was
asserted, the court found that the right was implicated
under such circumstances. See LaChapelle v. Mitten,
607N.W.2dl51,163 (Minn. App. 2000); In Re Custody
ofD.M.G.andT.J.G., 1998MT1, 951 P.2d 1377, 1381,
287 Mont. 120 (Mont. 1998) In Re Marriage of Cole,
224 Mont. 207, 729 R2d 1276, 1280 (Mont. 1986);
Jaramillov. Jaramillo, 113N.M. 57, 823R2d299, 304
(N.M. 1991); In Re Marriage of Sheley, 78 Wn. App.
494, 895 P. 2d 850 (Wish. App. 1995); overturned on
other grounds, In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d
39, 940 R2d 1362 (Wash. 1999); Witt v. Watt, 971
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R2d 608, 615-16 (Wyo. 1999). See also Sample and
Reiger, supra; Paula M. Raines, Joint Custody and the
Right to Travel: Legal and Psychological Implications,
24 J. Fam. L. 625, 630-638 [*21] (1985-86) ("Raines");
Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A
Constitutional Perspective, 34 U. Louisville J. Fam. L.
1, 67-80 (1995-96) ("LaFrance").
Most of these cases, in recognizing the role of the constitutional right to travel, hold that the right to travel is
qualified, and must be subject to the state's compelling
interest in protecting the best interests of the child by application of the best interests standard. See LaChapelle,
607N.W.2dl51; Cole, 224Mont. 207, 729R2d 1276;
D.M.G., 1998 MT1, 951 R2d 1377, 287Mont. 120;
Jaramillo, 113 N.M. 57, 823 R2d 299; cf. Sheley, 78
Wn. App. 494, 895 P. 2d 850 (right to travel is qualified
by state's compelling interest in protecting best interests of children, but to meet constitutional test, requires
showing of detriment to child if relocation is made).
Only one case, Watt, finds a "best interests" analysis
insufficient recognition of the parental right to travel,
and holds that the threshold requirement that a material
change of circumstances exists, which triggers the best
interest analysis, cannot be established merely by [*22]
proving relocation of the custodial parent. In Watt, the
Supreme Court of Wyoming placed a higher priority on
the constitutional right to travel than other states discussing the right:
The constitutional question posed is whether the rights
of a parent and the duty of the courts to adjudicate custody serve as a premise for restricting or inhibiting the
freedom to travel of a citizen of the State of Wyoming
and of the United States of America. We hold this to
be impossible. The right of travel enjoyed by a citizen
carries with it the right of a custodial parent to have
the children move with that parent. This right is not
to be denied, impaired, or disparaged unless clear evidence before the court demonstrates another substantial
and material change of circumstance and establishes the
detrimental effect of the move upon the children. While
relocation certainly may be stressful to a child, the normal anxieties of a change of residence and the inherent
difficulties that the increase in geographical distance between parents imposes are not considered to be 'detrimental' factors.
971 P.2d at 615-16 (citations omitted).
The other cases addressing the constitutional right of
travel, [*23] and its interplay with the best interests standard accord a lower priority to the constitutional right,
and in doing so, apply standards that are consistent with
the Court of Appeals decision in Domingues.

The intermediate appellate court of Minnesota has recognized that the constitutional right to travel is implicated in child custody disputes involving relocation, but
the right must be balanced against the state's interests in
protecting the best interests of the child:
The right to travel includes the right to 'live and settle
down anywhere one chooses in this country without being disadvantaged because of that choice.' The nature
of the disadvantage or hardship involved is important to
the level of review a restriction on the right to travel
receives. In this case the hardship imposed on [the custodial parent] is the loss of sole physical custody of her
daughter if she does not return to Minnesota. This implicates the fundamental right to raise one's child, which
triggers the application of strict scrutiny.
The deprivation of fundamental rights is subject to
strict scrutiny and may only be upheld if justified by
a compelling state interest. The compelling state [*24]
interest in this case is the protection of the best interests
of the child.
LaChapelle, 607N. W.2d at 163 (citations omitted). In
rejecting an equal protection argument by the mother,
the court reasoned:
The equal protection guarantees prevent the government
from making distinctions among people when applying
the law unless the distinction serves a legitimate governmental interest. In Minnesota, custody decisions are
based on the best interests of the child. The focus in
applying the best-interests standard is on the child, not
the parents, and therefore the standard applies equally
to all parents.
607N.W.2d at 165; cf. Cole, 729 R2d at 1280 (furthering the "best interests of the child, by assuring the
maximum opportunities for the love, guidance and support of both natural parents may constitute a compelling
state interest," but "interference with the fundamental
right" to travel must be made "cautiously").
In Jaramillo, the parties, as part of their divorce proceedings, entered a stipulation that they would share
joint legal custody of their daughter, Monica, which provided that Monica was to reside with [*25] her mother
each week, and with her father on alternate week-ends,
Wednesdays, and certain holidays. The mother advised
the father that she planned to move from New Mexico,
where the parties both lived, to New Hampshire, "where
her parents lived and where she believed she could find
steadier and more remunerative employment." 823 R2d
at 301. In the custody litigation that followed, both
parents sought primary physical custody. In addressing
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the interplay between the constitutional right to travel
and the competing concerns of the state ~ in the best
interests of the child, and the non-custodial parent - in
maintaining close association and frequent contact with
the child, the Supreme Courtof New Mexico said:
The protection afforded the right to travel in the childcustody context has been explicitly recognized by . . .
this C o u r t . . . . It makes no difference that the parent
who wishes to relocate is not prohibited outright from
doing so; a legal rule that operates to chill the exercise
of the right, absent a sufficient state interest to do so, is
as impermissible as one that bans exercise of the right
altogether.
* * *
By the same token, we believe that [*26] the other parent's right to maintain his or her close association and
frequent contact with the child should be equally free
from any unfavorable presumption that would place him
or her under the burden of showing that the proposed
removal of the child would be contrary to the child's
best interests. 'Freedom of personal choice in matters
of family life is a fundamental liberty interest.' Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394,
71 L.Ed. 2d 599 (1982).
823 P.2d at 305-06 (citations omitted).
The court rejected the notion that a relocation after the
parents' divorce is presumptively contrary to the child's
best interest, saying:
We think that such a presumption is potentially just
as inimical to the child's best interests as the opposite
presumption favoring the relocating parent and burdening the resisting parent with the requirement that he or
she prove that the move would be contrary to the child's
best interests.
Id. at 307.
It went on to explain why neither a presumption in favor of, nor a presumption against the custodial parent's
right to relocate should be indulged:

Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier
than individualized determination. But when, as here,
the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks
running roughshod over the important interests of both
parent and child. It therefore cannot stand.
(quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57, 92
S. Ct. 1208, 1215, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972)).
Id. (citations omitted). It went on to adopt the rule
that "neither party is under a burden to prove which arrangement will best promote the child's interests; both
parents share equally the burden of demonstrating how
the child's best interests will be served." 823 P.2d at
308. In adopting [*28] this rule, it recognized that:
Either party can initiate a proceeding to alter an existing custody arrangement on the ground that a substantial
and material change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child has occurred or is about to occur, and
the party seeking such change has the burden to show
that the existing arrangement is no longer workable. In
almost every case in which the change in circumstances
is occasioned by one parent's proposed relocation, the
proposed move will establish the substantiality and materiality of the change. It then becomes incumbent on the
trial court to consider as much information as the parties
choose to submit, or to elicit further information on its
own motion from the sources mentioned above or such
other sources as the court may have available, and to
decide what new arrangement will serve the child's best
interest. In such a proceeding neither parent will have
the burden to show that relocation of the child with the
removing parent will be in or contrary to the child's best
interests. Each party will have the burden to persuade
the court that the new custody arrangement or parenting
plan proposed by him or her should be adopted by [*29]
the court, but that party's failure to carry this burden
will only mean that the court remains free to adopt the
arrangement or plan that it determines best promotes the
child's interests.
Id. at 309.

Neither presumption . . . serves the . . . goal [*27] .
. . of determining and implementing the best interests
of the child. [One] presumption prefers the interest of
the remaining parent to that of the relocating parent; the
opposite presumption reverses the preferences assigned
to these interests. Both presumptions are subject to the
following criticism leveled by the United States Supreme
Court several years ago at 'procedure by presumption':

After review of the Supreme Court decisions in Saenz
and Shapiro, the out of state cases addressing the issue,
as well as commentary on the issue, n7 we conclude that
the standard set forth in Domingues for deciding custody disputes involving a parental relocation does not
interfere with a custodial parent's right to travel. The
Supreme Court has given no indication that the constitutional right to travel should be paramount over the state's
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interest in preserving the best interests of the children.
Indeed, the state's duty to protect the interests of minor
children has been recognized by the Supreme Court as
"duty of the highest order." Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S.
429, 433, 104 S. Ct. 1879, 1882, 80 L. Ed. 2d 421
(1984).

n7 We have reviewed several articles discussing the
constitutional right to travel and how it is or should
be applied in custody determinations. See Sample
and Reiger, supra; LaFrance, supra; Raines, supra.
[*30]
We consider the reasoning of the Supreme Court of
New Mexico in Jaramillo to be the most cogent analysis
of the appropriate interplay between the constitutional
right and the family law concerns, because it articulates
why a presumption favoring either the relocating custodial parent or the non-custodial parent would upset the
balance that is needed to arrive at a fair determination of
the child's best interests. There is no constitutional infirmity in giving equal status, in determining the child's
best interests, to (1) the custodial parent's right to travel,
and the benefit to be given the child from remaining with
the custodial parent; and (2) the benefit from the noncustodial parent's exercise of his right to maintain close
association and frequent contact with the child.
Treatment of the Right to Travel Under Domingues
Although the Court of Appeals in Domingues was not
presented with an argument based on the constitutional
right to travel, and did not rule on the constitutional issue, it did mention the "right to travel" in its opinion,
and made reference to commentaries n8 discussing the
right. In describing the law in other jurisdictions, the
Court [*31] of Appeals said:
n8 The Court cited the following commentaries: Raines, supra, 24 J. Fam L. 625 (198586); Spitzer, Moving and Storage of Postdivorce
Children; Relocation, the Constitution and the
Courts, 1 Ariz. St. L.J. 1 (1985); Note, Residence
Restrictions On Custodial Parents: Implications For
the Right to Travel, 12 Rutgers L.J. 341 (1980).
All of these commentaries discuss the constitutional
right to travel.
In some states the courts jealously protect the right of
travel, and place a heavy burden upon the parent who
would challenge the relocation. In other states, the bur-

den is placed upon the parent contemplating relocation to
show that it would be in the best interest of the child. The
legislatures of some states have enacted 'anti-removal'
statutes.
Domingues, 323 Md. at 501 (citation omitted).
Further, its reasoning regarding the best way, for nonconstitutional reasons, to determine the best interests of
the child when proposed relocation [*32] is involved, is
based on the fundamental concept, also evident in the
Jaramillo constitutional analysis, that there are no "absolutes" other than the best interests of the child. See
Domingues, 323 Md. at 501; Jaramillo, 823 R2d at
309 n.10 ("The respective interests of the parents are
relevant . . . and should be considered by the court;
but the interests of the child take precedence over any
conflicting interest of either parent."). The Court of
Appeals explained how the competing interests of the
parents might be viewed differently, depending on the
circumstances presented:
The view that a court takes toward relocation may reflect an underlying philosophy of whether the interest of
the child is best served by the certainty and stability of a
primary caretaker, or by ensuring significant day-to-day
contact with both parents. Certainly, the relationship
that exists between the parents and the child before relocation is of critical importance. If one parent has become
the primary caretaker, and the other parent has become
an occasional or infrequent visitor, evidencing little interest in day-to-day contact with the child, the adverse
effects [*33] of a move by the custodial parent will be
diminished. On the other hand, where both parents are
interested, and are actively involved with the life of the
child on a continuing basis, a move of any substantial
distance may upset a very desirable environment, and
may not be in the best interest of the child.
Id. at 501-02.
We conclude that the approach taken by the Court of
Appeals in Domingues sufficiently protects the constitutional right to travel because it requires consideration of
that right, and gives the parent choosing to exercise that
right an equal footing as the other parent with respect
to the burden to show the best interests of the children.
Accordingly, we see no reason, based on Saenz, supra,
or the right to travel, as recognized in other Supreme
Court decisions, to modify the standards for considering relocation cases from that set forth in Domingues.
III.
Material Change in Circumstances
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Appellant argues that under the circumstances of this
case, her relocation to Arizona did not warrant a material change in circumstances sufficient to order a change
in custody, and that the trial court based its finding of
change solely [*34] on her relocation. She also asserts
that she "seems to be extraordinarily adept at rubbing
people . . . the wrong way" and that the judge's dislike for her in conjunction with admiration for appellee
amounts to a "popularity contest" and was the reason for
the custody transfer. We disagree. The record makes
clear that, in deciding to transfer custody, the trial court
carefully considered all the evidence before it with a
view towards determining the best interests of the child.
It considered the relocation to Arizona, and the effect
the move would have on Theresa. Its decision that the
change in circumstances, when considered in light of
Theresa's best interests, warranted a change in custody,
was well supported by the evidence.
The threshold issue is the existence of a material
change. A change of custody resolution is generally
"a chronological two-step process." Wagner v. Wagner,
109 Md. App. /, 28, 674 A.2d 1, cert, denied, 343
Md. 334, 681 A.2d 69 (1996). Initially, unless a material change of circumstances is found to exist, the court's
inquiry must cease. See id. If a material change is found
to exist, "then the court, in resolving the [*35] custody
issue, considers the best interest of the child as if it were
an original custody proceeding." Id.
In determining whether the change was material we
look to whether the changes related to the welfare of the
child. SeeMcCready, supra, 323 Md. at 481. The factors to be considered in determining custody of a child include, but [are] not limited to: (1) fitness of the parents;
(2) character and reputation of the parties; (3) desire of
the natural parents and agreements between the parties;
(4) potentiality of maintaining natural family relations;
(5) preference of the child; (6) material opportunities
affecting the future life of the child; (7) age, health and
sex of the child; (8) residences of parents and opportunity for visitation; (9) length of separation from the
natural parents; and (10) prior voluntary abandonment
or surrender.
Montgomery County v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406,
420, 381 A.2d 1154 (1978) (citations omitted). As we
discussed in Section II, changes "brought about by the
relocation of a parent may, in a given case, be sufficient
to justify a change in custody." Domingues, 323 Md.
at 500; see also [*36] Goldmeier v. Lepselter, 89 Md.
App. 301, 309, 598A.2d482 (1991).
The record contains considerable evidence that appellant actively sought to interfere with or prevent appellee

from having a relationship with Theresa, and that she had
no appreciation for the need of her daughter to have a
relationship with her father. Further, Dr. Gombatz's report contained significant information regarding appellant's personality that negatively influenced her ability
to serve as the custodial parent. The trial court considered Dr. Gombatz's report, and observed that appellant'
sconduct is totally consistent with the diagnosis that Dr.
Gombatz had given me so that I used Dr. Gombatz'[s]
report not as a primary tool in making a decision in this
case but as a back up tool, as a test, and the diagnosis and
observations made by Dr. Gombatz are consistent with
and confirm the observations that I made in this courtroom. The diagnosis of borderline personality disorder
. . . produces a personality that is extremely difficult
to work with.
[Appellant] does what she perceives to be right and
fair and just and simply doesn't consider what anyone
else wants . . . . She [acts] with what [*37] is consistent with her own interests and the testimony that I
heard bears that out and Dr. Gombatz simply confirms
it.
The trial court determined that a change in circumstances had occurred, and that it was material. The
court found that: (1) appellant moved to Arizona with
the intent to "separate the child from the father" to place
"distance between the child and the father" and "to avoid
contact between father and child;" (2) there was "no evidence that there is a health issue on the part of either
the child or [appellant] that justified the move. . .
. The child does not have asthma;" (3) appellant was
an "unreliable" witness with "totally inappropriate" demeanor on the witness stand on "many" occasions, and
"is not a reliable fact giver;" (4) appellant "left the state
of Maryland without giving prior notice" to appellee;
(5) appellant "does discourage the child from calling [appellee] 'Dad' and from addressing the grandparents in
appropriate terms as 'grandmother' or 'granddad'"; (6)
"Matthew does refer to [appellee] in derogatory terms
in front of Teresa," and Matthew's low opinion of appellee is "based exclusively upon the information that
[appellant] has provided to [*38] these children;" and
(7) appellant "is avoiding telephone calls" from appellee
to Theresa, and that she "is unwilling to communicate
with [appellee] in any reasonable way."
The court considered highly significant its finding that
appellant "gave no consideration to the impact of her
conduct on either the child or herself." It observed that
"there was no thought given to the consequences of removing the child from the State of Maryland without
resolving the visitation issue. . . . There has been
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no consideration on [appellant's] part from what the impact of blocking access of this child to this father would
be. And it's simply because she doesn't like [appellee]
and [she] is very angry at [appellee] over his failure to
follow through to get married. . . . And I find that
[appellant] is simply unable to separate her own needs
from the needs of the child."
(Emphasis added).
We believe the evidence before the trial court supported its findings that appellant did not consider
Theresa's best interests prior to moving the child out
of the State of Maryland, and that she is incapable of
separating her own interests from the best interests of
her child. The relocation [*39] from Maryland is a
modification that will particularly effect Theresa's best
interests because of appellant's unwillingness to cooperate to foster a good relation between Theresa and her
father. If Theresa were to live in a distant state with
appellant, it would be easier for appellant to undermine
Theresa's relationship with her father. Similarly, the
long distance would make it harder for appellee to overcome the obstacles created by appellant. The potential
for maintaining natural family relations is one factor to

be considered in determining custody of a child. See
Montgomery County, 38 Md. App. at 420. As discussed
in Section II, the relocation of appellant to another state,
can, under Maryland law, constitute the material change
in circumstances necessary to trigger the best interests
analysis. StzDomingues, 323 Md. at 500-03. This case
presents the proto-type of an instance when a relocation
meets the Domingues and constitutional standards.
The trial court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses, and view all of the evidence. We cannot say
that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding
that there had been a material change [*40] in circumstances, and the best interests of Theresa warranted a
modification of appellant's parental rights. Based on its
factual findings, the court's award was not clearly erroneous. See Lemley v. Lemley, 109 Md. App. 620,
627-628, 675A.2d596 (1996) ("A chancellor's decision
founded upon sound legal principles and based upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous will not be
disturbed in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse
of discretion.").
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLANT.

